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THE SUBSTANTIAL IMPACT APPROACH: REVIEWING
POLICY STATEMENTS IN LIGHT OF APA FINALITY
Emily Parsons*
Abstract: Federal agencies engage in a wide range of non-binding action, issuing guidance
documents such as policy statements and interpretive rules. Although these guidance
documents may have a substantial impact on industries or members of the public, courts often
refuse to review their substance. The Administrative Procedure Act requires agency action to
be “final” before courts can review it. The D.C. Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have taken
conflicting and often messy approaches in determining whether interpretive rules and policy
statements are final and thus reviewable. This Comment proposes a new approach: the
substantial impact approach. Under this approach—repurposed from a rejected test for
procedural sufficiency of guidance documents—courts could review a guidance document that
has a substantial impact on affected parties. This Comment analyzes the 2017 Department of
Homeland Security memorandum rescinding Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals,
highlighting it as an example of a subset of policy statements that should be reviewable under
the proposed substantial impact approach.

*
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INTRODUCTION
In November of 2017, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
issued a memorandum rescinding the Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals (DACA) program.1 In response, Dulce Garcia, a San Diego
lawyer who entered the country undocumented at the age of four, sued the
federal government.2 So did several other plaintiffs across the country.3
As these claims continue to work their way through the federal court
system,4 an important question will likely remain unanswered because it
was waived:5 was the rescission of DACA “final” under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)?6 This question matters because if
rescission was non-final, Garcia’s challenge of the rescission was not
reviewable in court in the first place.
In 2012, U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano issued
a memorandum announcing DACA.7 This policy identified
undocumented individuals who entered the United States as children as
“low priority” for deportation when they met enumerated criteria,
including a clean criminal record.8 Effectively, DACA allowed these

1. Memorandum from Elaine C. Duke, Acting Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to James W. McCament,
Acting Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Serv., et al. (Sept. 5, 2017) [hereinafter Duke Memo],
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/05/memorandum-rescission-daca
[https://perma.cc/PPT37G9F]; Carrie Johnson, Trump Rescinds DACA, Calls on Congress to Replace It, NPR (Sept. 6, 2017,
4:59 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/09/06/548819221/trump-administration-rescinds-daca-callson-congress-to-replace-it [https://perma.cc/E4KM-Q7X5].
2. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 486 (9th Cir. 2018),
cert. granted, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2779 (June 28, 2019).
3. NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209, 237 (D.D.C. 2018), adhered to on denial of
reconsideration, 315 F. Supp. 3d 457 (D.D.C. 2018); Batalla Vidal v. Duke, No. 16-cv-41196
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2017); Regents, 908 F.3d at 514.
4. See Status of Current DACA Litigation, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR. (June 7, 2019),
https://www.nilc.org/issues/daca/status-current-daca-litigation/ [https://perma.cc/8CDJ-4GEH]. The
Supreme Court recently granted certiorari of the Ninth Circuit’s decision, preliminarily enjoining the
rescission of DACA. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d
1011, 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2018), aff’d, 908 F.3d 476 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, __ U.S. __, 139 S.
Ct. 2779 (2019).
5. See infra Part II (discussing the D.C. Circuit’s 2016 opinion holding that finality is not a
jurisdictional element and can thus be waived); infra notes 319–320 and accompanying text
(explaining that the DOJ failed to raise finality in any of its briefing at the trial court level).
6. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012).
7. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to David V. Aguilar, Acting
Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al. (June 15, 2012) [hereinafter Napolitano Memo],
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-cameto-us-as-children.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WUA-V2FH].
8. Id.
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young people to apply for deferred action in two-year increments.9
Deferred action, a longstanding practice of prosecutorial discretion,10
allows DHS to focus its attention and limited resources on removing
undocumented individuals that pose a security risk by designating certain
individuals as low priority for deportation.11 Individuals that receive
deferred action are classified as “lawfully present” in the United States,
and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services will not initiate removal
proceedings against those individuals.12 Lawfully present individuals
may, in some instances, qualify for federal public benefits such as social
security, welfare, and health insurance13 or state public benefits.14
Moreover, these individuals can apply for work authorization.15 Lawful
presence is not an enforceable right, however,16 and DHS may revoke it
at any time.17
In 2017, after a change in administration, the DHS Acting Secretary
Elaine C. Duke issued a memorandum rescinding DACA.18 Duke relied
to some extent on a letter from then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions, which
explained that the original DACA program had been unlawful.19 The
decision triggered Garcia’s suit.20

9. Id.
10. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to León Rodríguez,
Director, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., et al. (Nov. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Johnson Memo]
(citing IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, OPERATION INSTRUCTIONS § 103.l (a)(l)(ii)
(1975)) (explaining that DHS’s practice of granting deferred action can be traced at least as far back
as 1975).
11. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 188 (5th Cir. 2015) (King, J., dissenting), as
revised (Nov. 25, 2015).
12. Id. at 148.
13. 8 U.S.C. § 1611(a)–(c) (2012) (stating that section (a) exempts unqualified aliens from federal
public benefits, (b) creates an exception for “lawfully present” individuals, and (c) defines federal
public benefits). A lawfully present individual must still meet the independent qualifying criteria for
public benefits. See Texas, 809 F.3d at 148.
14. 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d) (“A State may provide that an alien who is not lawfully present in the
United States is eligible for any State or local public benefit . . . only through the enactment of a State
law . . . which affirmatively provides for such eligibility.”).
15. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2019).
16. Texas, 809 F.3d at 188 (King, J., dissenting).
17. Zuzana Cepla, Deferred Action Basics, NAT’L IMMIGR. F. (Apr. 15, 2016)
https://immigrationforum.org/article/deferred-action-basics/ [https://perma.cc/36WY-E8CY].
18. See supra note 1.
19. Letter from Jeff Sessions, U.S. Att’y Gen. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Elaine C. Duke, Acting Sec’y, U.S.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0904_DOJ_AG-letterDACA.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9RB-YH9C] (arguing, among other things, that the program lacked
statutory authority).
20. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 486 (9th Cir. 2018),
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DHS is a federal agency, and it issued both the DACA program and its
subsequent rescission as policy statements.21 Policy statements—and their
cousins, interpretive rules—are a useful but controversial agency tool.
Agencies issue policy statements “to advise the public prospectively of
the manner in which the agency proposes to exercise a discretionary
power.”22 Interpretive rules, on the other hand, “advise the public of the
agency’s construction of the statutes and rules which it administers.”23
Both policy statements and interpretive rules purport to be non-binding,
thereby avoiding the cumbersome notice-and-comment rulemaking
procedures required for binding agency action.24
In practice, however, these rules can have real-world consequences on
the lives and daily business activities of private individuals like Garcia,
whether binding or not.25 DHS issued both DACA26 and its rescission27
without undergoing notice-and-comment procedures. Regardless of realworld consequences, the Ninth Circuit agreed that both DACA and its
rescission constituted non-binding policy statements and acknowledged
that a failure to observe these procedures was not improper.28
In addition to avoiding the APA’s procedural requirements, policy
statements have frequently been held as non-final agency action.29 The
APA requires that agency action be final before it can be reviewed.30 Thus,
if the DACA rescission does not constitute final agency action, a court
cannot review the substance of the policy statement until final agency
cert. granted, __U.S.__, 139 S. Ct. 2779 (June 28, 2019).
21. Id.
22. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT 30 n.3 (1947), https://www.regulationwriters.com/downloads/AttorneyGeneralsM
anual.pdf [https://perma.cc/AJ9L-3TET] (emphasis added).
23. Id.
24. Stephen Hylas, Final Agency Action in the Administrative Procedure Act, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1644, 1651 (2017) (citing Jeff Bowen & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Partisan Politics and Executive
Accountability: Argentina in Comparative Perspective, 10 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 157, 196 (2003)).
25. See infra section I.A.
26. Regents, 908 F.3d at 489.
27. Id. at 491.
28. See id. at 494–503 (discussing and distinguishing 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2012)’s bar on judicial
review of “agency action . . . committed to agency discretion by law”).
29. See infra Part III.
30. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012) (“[P]reliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or
ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency action.”); id. § 551
(defining “agency action” as “the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or
the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act”); Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322,
1326 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (reviewing otherwise unreviewable presidential action once agency action
implementing it became final).
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action relying on it is brought.31 In other words, Garcia might have to wait
until deportation proceedings were brought against her before a court
would even hear the merits of her claim.
To determine whether agency action is final, courts apply the Bennett
v. Spear32 test. Final agency action (1) “mark[s] the ‘consummation’ of
the agency’s decisionmaking process” and (2) is action by which “‘rights
or obligations have been determined,’ or from which ‘legal consequences
will flow.’”33 Recently, the Supreme Court has reemphasized a pragmatic
approach to finality, suggesting that the practical effects of agency action
play a role in the finality analysis.34 However, the Supreme Court has
never meaningfully reviewed the finality of a policy statement or
interpretive rule.35
Without precise guidance from the Supreme Court, the lower courts
have taken conflicting and often messy approaches to reviewing policy
statements and interpretive rules. The D.C. Circuit applies what this
Comment refers to as the “categorical approach.”36 The categorical
approach generally determines that both policy statements and
interpretive rules are non-final because they are non-binding.37
Conversely, the Ninth Circuit applies the “flexible approach,” which
sometimes holds interpretive rules to be final, but seemingly refuses to
hold a true policy statement as final.38 In two notable 2019 opinions, both
circuits appeared to shift their approaches.39 The D.C. Circuit shifted
toward a flexible approach, holding that non-binding agency action is not
categorically non-final.40 The Ninth Circuit expanded its flexible

31. See supra note 30.
32. 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
33. Id. at 177–78.
34. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 578 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1807, 1815 (2016).
35. See infra notes 201–204 and accompanying text (explaining that the Supreme Court determined
that a policy statement was final without any analysis and proceeded to dismiss it on other grounds).
36. These terms were adapted from the terms “Rigid Approach” and “Pragmatic Approach,” as
used by Steven J. Lindsay. See Steven J. Lindsay, Timing Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations
in Chevron’s Shadow, 127 YALE L.J. 2448, 2452–53 (2018). Lindsay identified three main approaches
the lower courts have taken to reviewing interpretive rules. Id. This Comment does not discuss the
third approach because it is not relevant to policy statements, the main focus of this Comment.
37. See infra section III.A.
38. See infra section III.B.
39. See generally Gill v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 913 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2019); Cal. Cmtys. Against
Toxics v. EPA, 934 F.3d 627 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
40. Cal. Cmtys., 934 F.3d at 631.
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approach, holding that a policy statement was final.41
This Comment argues that some policy statements, including the
rescission of DACA, should be final and reviewable. It proposes that the
substantial impact test—a test that was first used to determine whether
interpretive rules and policy statements needed to undergo notice-andcomment rulemaking procedures and was later held invalid—is actually
appropriate for determining whether guidance documents are final and
thus reviewable in court.
This Comment proceeds in four Parts. Part I defines policy statements
and interpretive rules. Part II explores finality as a bar to judicial review
of agency action in courts. Part III explores the approaches that lower
courts have taken to finality when reviewing interpretive rules and policy
statements, particularly with respect to Bennett’s second prong. Part IV
argues that some policy statements, including the DACA rescission,
should be reviewable. It proposes that courts apply the substantial impact
test in place of Bennett’s second prong to provide judicial review of policy
statements that have a substantial impact outside of the agency.
I.

GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS AS NON-BINDING
AGENCY ACTION

Federal agencies take credit for producing the vast majority of binding
federal law.42 Yet agencies also engage in a wide range of non-binding
action.43 The umbrella term “guidance document” refers to agency
documents that detail non-binding action.44 These documents generally
seek to explain an agency’s policies or to define and interpret binding
regulations.45 Guidance documents are quite numerous, often
41. Gill, 913 F.3d at 1184–85 (citing Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 465 F.3d 977, 982
(9th Cir. 2006)).
42. CLYDE WAYNE CREWS, JR., COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST., MAPPING WASHINGTON’S
LAWLESSNESS 2016: A PRELIMINARY INVENTORY OF “REGULATORY DARK MATTER” 3 (2015),
https://cei.org/sites/default/files/Wayne%20Crews%20-%20Mapping%20Washington%27s%
20Lawlessness.pdf [https://perma.cc/QLF4-CBSN] (“Congress passes a few dozen public laws every
year, but federal agencies issue several thousand . . . regulations.”).
43. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-368, REGULATORY GUIDANCE PROCESSES:
SELECTED DEPARTMENTS COULD STRENGTHEN INTERNAL CONTROL AND DISSEMINATION
PRACTICES
1
(2015)
[hereinafter
U.S.
GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE],
https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/669688.pdf [https://perma.cc/UWZ3-2587].
44. See, e.g., Gwendolyn McKee, Judicial Review of Agency Guidance Documents: Rethinking the
Finality Doctrine, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 371, 375 (2008); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra
note 43, at 1.
45. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 43, at 1 (defining “guidance document” as
“an agency statement of general applicability and future effect, other than a regulatory action, that
sets forth a policy on a statutory, regulatory, or technical issue or an interpretation of a statutory or
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outnumbering the binding regulations and statutes for which they seek to
provide guidance.46 Because guidance documents avoid the rigorous
notice-and-comment procedural requirements that courts have imposed
for issuing binding rules, agencies may be tempted to impermissibly issue
binding rules as guidance documents. Recognizing this, courts apply a
variety of procedural sufficiency tests to determine whether a guidance
document
needed
to
undergo
notice-and-comment
rulemaking procedures.
A.

Defining Guidance Documents

As non-binding agency action, guidance documents are largely defined
by what they are not: legislative rules. The APA exempts by name both
policy statements and interpretive rules from notice-and-comment
rulemaking procedures required for issuing legislative rules.47 And this
exemption is not insignificant.
To enact legislative rules,48 the bare text of the APA requires only a
“[g]eneral notice of proposed rule making,”49 an opportunity for written
public comment,50 and “a concise general statement of . . . basis and
purpose.”51 However, in the 1960s and 1970s, various judicial glosses
were added to the notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures.52

regulatory issue”).
46. Id. (“The number of guidance documents related to regulations issued by agencies has often
been reported to outnumber the agency regulations that these documents can help explain.”).
47. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2012) (“[T]his subsection does not apply . . . to interpretative rules, [or]
general statements of policy.”); McKee, supra note 44, at 375. The APA also exempts procedural
rules, which are guidance documents, but are not the subject of this Comment. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A).
48. The APA requires notice-and-comment for “informal rulemaking.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). “Formal
Rulemaking” is now rarely used. See Kent Barnett, How the Supreme Court Derailed Formal
Rulemaking, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 1, 1 (2017) (“In two railroad cases decided in the
early 1970s, the Supreme Court allowed formal rulemaking to fall largely into desuetude with little
fanfare.”).
49. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b).
50. Id. § 553(c).
51. Id.
52. Compare the textual requirements of a proposed notice of rulemaking in 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)
(requiring a “[g]eneral notice of proposed rule making . . . published in the Federal Register
[including] reference to the legal authority [and] the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a
description of the subjects and issues involved”), with Home Box Office, Inc. v. F.C.C., 567 F.2d 9,
36 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (requiring agencies to “make [their] views known to the public in a concrete and
focused form so as to make criticism or formulation of alternatives possible”) (emphasis added), and
with Lisa Marshall Manheim & Kathryn A. Watts, Reviewing Presidential Orders, 86 U. CHI. L. REV.
1743, 1755–56 (2019) (“These judicial glosses emerged in the 1960s and 1970s as the importance of
rulemaking was surging, and they persist to this day.”).
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Although these judicial glosses may have increased the quality of
substantive judicial review,53 the resulting procedural requirements place
a heavy burden on agencies.54 When issuing guidance documents, this
non-legislative status affords agencies a valuable benefit. Rather than
contend with the rigorous notice-and-comment requirements, “agencies
often instead try to opt-out of the section 553 [notice-and-comment]
process” by issuing guidance documents, such as interpretive rules and
policy statements, in lieu of regulations.55
One type of guidance documents are policy statements: “statements
issued by an agency to advise the public prospectively of the manner in
which the agency proposes to exercise a discretionary power.”56 Policy
statements “educat[e] . . . agency members in the agency’s work.”57
Policy statements may be issued at all levels of the agency, by agency
headquarters or field offices,58 under a variety of names—including
memoranda, guidance, manuals, and staff instructions.59
Interpretive rules, on the other hand, share many characteristics with
policy statements—although some courts are careful to distinguish the
two.60 Interpretive rules are “rules or statements issued by an agency to
advise the public of the agency’s construction of the statutes and rules
which it administers.”61 Agency staff may issue interpretive rules at the
request of regulated entities seeking to determine whether their proposed
53. GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 387 (7th ed. 2007) (describing the D.C.
Circuit’s “elaborate notice of proposed rulemaking” requirements as a procedural tool to allow more
robust substantive review of agency decisions).
54. Hylas, supra note 24, at 1648–49 (“[The notice-and-comment] process can be a timeconsuming headache that allows the public to both inundate the agency with comments and file
potentially endless lawsuits arguing that the procedures are arbitrary and capricious.”); id. at 1651
(“[O]ver the last several decades, [it] has changed significantly in ways that have created so many
disadvantages to use of the process that many agencies avoid it whenever possible.” (quoting
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 64 (2d ed. 2012))).
55. Id. at 1651.
56. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 22 (emphasis added).
57. Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023, 1030 (2d Cir. 1975) (quoting H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 145–46 (1962)).
58. Robert A. Anthony & David A. Codevilla, Pro-Ossification: A Harder Look at Agency Policy
Statements, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 667, 671 (1996).
59. Id.
60. See infra Part III. The D.C. Circuit has been inconsistent about whether policy statements and
interpretive rules even warrant a separate analysis. Compare Syncor Int’l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d
90, 93–94 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (carefully distinguishing policy statements from interpretive rules), with
Am. Tort Reform Ass’n v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 738 F.3d 387, 393 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
(“Not much turns on the distinction between policy statements and interpretative rules.” (quoting
EDWARDS, ELLIOT, & LEVY, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW 162 (2d ed. 2013))).
61. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 22.
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action would violate a regulation or statute.62 Agency heads may also
issue interpretive rules as an agency-wide interpretation of a statute or
regulation.63
B.

Procedural Sufficiency: Refining the Meaning of
Guidance Documents

Although policy statements and interpretive rules purport to be nonbinding, they “typically include detailed instructions for regulatory
compliance”64 and can be highly coercive toward regulated parties.65
Indeed, agencies may be tempted to issue new binding rules as policy
statements or interpretive rules, a tactic referred to as agency
gamesmanship.66 Litigants, in turn, may challenge a purported policy
statement or interpretive rule as procedurally insufficient, arguing that the
agency action is actually a legislative rule masquerading as non-binding
guidance.67 Courts then employ a procedural sufficiency test to determine
whether the rule is legislative. Failing such a test invalidates any
legislative rule that did not undergo the requisite procedures.
These procedural sufficiency tests seek to further clarify the line
between binding and non-binding agency action. The resulting caselaw,
however, has arguably “enshrouded” that distinction “in considerable
smog.”68 As this Comment will further explore in Part III, these tests
appear to be serving a second purpose in the lower courts: determining
whether agency action is final. Wading through this “considerable smog”
is thus dually necessary. This Comment will provide an overview of four
identifiable procedural sufficiency tests: (1) the legal effects test; (2) the
substantial impact test; (3) the impact on agencies test; and (4) the
American Mining69 test.
62. See Soundboard Ass’n v. FTC, 888 F.3d 1261, 1264–65, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (reviewing staff
opinion letter that informed a company that its use of prerecorded messages that were triggered by a
live agent were not “robocalls” under the regulation).
63. See, e.g., Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1120 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’d sub nom. Gonzales v.
Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006) (reviewing as an interpretive rule a directive issued by the attorney
general “proclaim[ing] that physician assisted suicide serves no ‘legitimate medical purpose’ under 21
C.F.R. § 1306.04”).
64. McKee, supra note 44, at 372.
65. Lindsay, supra note 36, at 2452–53 (2018); see, e.g., United States v. Acquest Transit LLC,
No. 09-CV-00055S(F), 2018 WL 3861612, at *14 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2018) (discussing an agency’s
enforcement action “maintain[ing] [Defendant] failed to follow the Corps’ 2005 guidance”).
66. Hylas, supra note 24, at 1651.
67. See, e.g., Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
68. E.g., id. at 947 (quoting Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023, 1030 (2d Cir. 1975)).
69. Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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The Legal Effects Test

One simple test to distinguish a legislative rule from a guidance
document is the legal effects test.70 The legal effects test holds that a rule
that “creates a binding norm”71 and “has the force of law”72 is a legislative
rule.73 In effect, this test invalidates only rules that use binding language.74
Of course, agencies may supplement non-binding language with a
predictable pattern of implementation,75 coercion,76 and implication,77
resulting in similar practical effects to binding substantive rules.78 In
recognition of this concern, other tests have emerged to supplement the
legal effects test.
2.

The Substantial Impact Test

The substantial impact test seemed to solve the problem of agency
gamesmanship in one swoop. This test looked to see if an interpretive rule
or a policy statement had “a substantial impact on the rights and interests
of the parties . . . .”79 If the court deemed there was a substantial impact,
the rule was required to undergo notice-and-comment rulemaking
procedures.

70. See LAWSON, supra note 53, at 420.
71. See id. at 421; Jessica S. Schaffer, Air Transport Association of America v. Department of
Transportation: Excess Baggage for Rules of Agency Procedure, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 313, 322
(1993); see, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Kast Metals Corp., 744 F.2d 1145, 1153 (5th Cir. 1984)
(applying the substantial impact test).
72. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
73. See supra note 71.
74. Pac. Gas, 506 F.2d at 38.
75. U.S. Tel. Ass’n v. FCC, 28 F.3d 1232,1245 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (identifying at most three incidents
out of over 100 when the agency failed to conform to the penalty schedule it had outline in a purported
policy statement).
76. LAWSON, supra note 53, at 422–23; see also Leslie M. MacRae & Kenneth E. Nicely, Break
the Rules and Run an Industry: Guidance Manuals More Destructive of the Rule of Law Than Bad
Accounting, 11 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 7–8 (2003) (describing how regulated industries and the
politics of the administration in charge may affect an agency’s regulatory behavior).
77. LAWSON, supra note 53, at 422–23.
78. Id.
79. Kathleen Taylor, The Substantial Impact Test: Victim of the Fallout from Vermont Yankee?,
53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 118, 138 n.157 (1984) (citing Action on Smoking & Health v. C.A.B., 699
F.2d 1209, 1216 n.47 (D.C. Cir. 1983)); see, e.g., Pickus v. U.S. Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (applying the substantial impact test to determine that agency’s rule was neither
interpretive rule nor general statement of policy); Lewis-Mota v. Sec’y of Labor, 469 F.2d 478, 481–
82 (2d Cir. 1972) (applying the substantial impact test to determine that an agency’s rule was neither
an interpretive rule, a policy statement, nor a procedural rule).
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The court in Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of Labor80 applied the substantial
impact test to the revocation of a policy that prioritizing certain
applications for permanent residency.81 The Secretary of Labor published
a schedule that listed a number of occupational categories as being short
in labor supply.82 Applicants with the listed occupations qualified for precertification for permanent residency.83 They did not need to show a job
offer or submit a statement of their qualifications along with the
application.84 Without observing notice-and-comment procedures, the
Secretary suspended the system.85 In holding that the revocation of the
schedule needed to undergo notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures,
the court expressed that the schedule and its subsequent revocation had a
substantial impact on employers and undocumented individuals.86
Revoking the schedule made it more difficult for employers to fill job
vacancies, and burdened individuals within the named occupations by
requiring them to submit additional information before they could qualify
for permanent residency.87
The substantial impact test raised fundamental concerns, both practical
and legal. The D.C. Circuit objected in particular to the use of the
substantial impact test for interpretive rules. The test, it argued, had “no
limiting principles”88 as “under the ‘substantial impact’ test every
significant interpretative rule automatically becomes a legislative rule by
virtue of its effect.”89 Furthermore, legal scholars and the lower courts
inferred the holding of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.90—a 1978 Supreme Court case
addressing notice-and-comment judicial glosses—as disqualifying the
substantial impact test altogether.91 Vermont Yankee prevented courts
80. 469 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1972).
81. Id. at 482.
82. Id. at 480.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 482.
87. Id. at 480.
88. Taylor, supra note 79, at 126.
89. Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Dep’t of Energy, 589 F.2d 1082, 1094–95 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1978).
90. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
91. See, e.g., Levesque v. Block, 723 F.2d 175, 182 (1st Cir. 1983) (“We agree
that substantial impact does not make a rule legislative, but whether a rule has
a substantial impact may be relevant in construing the intent of the agency in issuing the rule.”);
Rivera v. Becerra, 714 F.2d 887, 890–91 (9th Cir. 1983) (“Thus, in view of the express exemption

19 Parsons.docx (Do Not Delete)

506

4/28/20 7:23 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:495

from adding judicial glosses to agencies’ procedures beyond those
grounded in the APA,92 and the lower courts labeled the substantial impact
test just such a judicial gloss:93 the words “substantial impact” do not
appear in the text of the APA,94 and scholars argued that the test “ha[d] no
plausible grounding in the . . . history of [section] 553 of the APA.”95
3.

The Impact on Agencies Test for Policy Statements

Although courts no longer apply the substantial impact test,96 most
courts apply some version of a newer test to distinguish between
legislative rules and policy statements: the impact on agencies test.97
Rather than focusing on the impact on private individuals or industries—
as the substantial impact test did—this test focuses on the impact on the
agency itself. A rule that effectively binds the discretion of the agency is
a legislative rule, even if it purports to be non-binding.98 More
specifically, courts might infer from a pattern of enforcement99 or detailed
internal guidelines100 that the ostensible policy statement is in fact a
in section 553 and the admonition of Vermont Yankee, we reject the substantial impact test and
reverse the district court on this issue.”); LAWSON, supra note 53, at 423 (citing Cabais v. Egger, 690
F.2d 234, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1982)) (arguing that, under Cabais, “[i]nterpretative and substantive rules
may both vitally affect private interests, thus, the substantial impact test has no utility in
distinguishing between the two”); Taylor, supra note 79, at 127 (“The [Vermont Yankee] Court’s dicta
declared that agencies should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure and that courts should
not mandate rulemaking procedures that Congress has not required except in extremely rare
circumstances. Thus, where the enabling statute or the APA does not require notice and comment,
courts may not mandate those procedures.”).
92. Taylor, supra note 79, at 118 (describing how the Court in Vermont Yankee “emphatically
declared that the judiciary could not engraft its own notions of proper procedure onto the APA”).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 126 (“There is nothing in the APA to warrant employment of the ‘substantial impact’ test
to classify interpretative and legislative rules. The phrase ‘substantial impact’ does not appear in the
APA.” (quoting Energy, 589 F.2d at 1094–95)).
95. LAWSON, supra note 53, at 423.
96. Id. For a thorough exploration of the effect of Vermont Yankee’s holding and dicta on lower
courts’ application of the substantial impact test, see generally Taylor, supra note 79.
97. LAWSON, supra note 53, at 423. Scholars also refer to the test as the “practically binding test.”
E.g., Cass R. Sunstein, “Practically Binding”: General Policy Statements and Notice-and-Comment
Rulemaking, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 491, 496 (2016).
98. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 171 (5th Cir. 2015); Prof’ls & Patients for Customized
Care v. Shalala, 56 F.3d 592 (5th Cir. 1995); U.S. Tel. Ass’n v. FCC, 28 F.3d 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
99. Supra note 75.
100. See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 328 F. Supp. 3d 662, 732 (S.D. Tex. 2018) (considering
evidence of “hundreds of pages of DHS manuals and procedures that instruct, in painful detail, each
step a reviewer should take and what types of evidence each reviewer may consider as evidence.”);
U.S. Tel. Ass’n, 28 F.3d at 1247 (taking into account agency’s highly detailed penalty schedule in
determining that the agency was bound to follow a guidance document).
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legislative rule in disguise, even if it uses non-binding language.
In the Ninth Circuit’s review of the memorandum rescinding DACA, it
applied the impact on agencies test, determining that both the original
DACA program and its rescission were a policy statement.101 Regarding
the original program, the court pointed to DHS’s use of discretionary
language and the fact that, although DACA applicants “self-select” (given
that the application requires applicants to volunteer their immigration
status and thereby risk exposing themselves to deportation),102 the agency
still denied 17.8% of applicants.103 This denial rate was not insignificant
and suggested that agency officials were not automatically applying the
criteria.104 Instead, officials were using judgment and discretion in
evaluating each applicant.105 The Ninth Circuit similarly characterized the
rescission of DACA as a policy statement.106 While the memorandum
requires agency officials to reject new applications for the DACA
program, it also explicitly allows DHS to continue to grant deferred action
on a case-by-case basis, leaving the background principles of
prosecutorial discretion in place.107
4.

The American Mining Test for Interpretive Rules

Courts often rely on a test laid out in cases such as American Mining to
distinguish interpretive rules from legislative rules.108 The American
Mining test focuses on whether the agency intended to have the force and
effect of law.109 Specifically, a rule is merely interpretive when “in the
absence of the [interpretation] there would [ ] be an adequate [regulatory]
basis for enforcement action.”110 A rule that “repudiates or is
irreconcilable with [a statute or regulation],” however, cannot be an
interpretive rule because it amends rather than clarifies the law.111
Some courts carefully distinguish policy statements from interpretive
101. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 507–08 (9th
Cir. 2018).
102. Id. at 507 (citing Texas, 809 F.3d at 210 (King, J., dissenting)).
103. Id. at 507–08.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 513.
107. Id.
108. McKee, supra note 44, at 389.
109. Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
110. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1997), abrogated
by Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92 (2015) (quoting Am. Mining, 995 F.2d at 1112).
111. Am. Mining, 995 F.2d at 1113.
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rules,112 reserving the impact on agencies test for policy statements113 and
the American Mining test for interpretive rules.114 These courts reason that
the impact on agencies test is not as effective at distinguishing interpretive
rules from legislative rules.115 In fact, some Ninth Circuit decisions have
expressed that interpretive rules may fail the impact on agencies test and
yet still not be legislative rules.116 This occurs because some interpretative
rules cabin agency discretion in future conduct.117 Agency-wide
interpretations may require agency officials to rely on the interpretive rule
in future action.118 Courts that accept this reasoning hold that interpretive
rules nonetheless do not carry the force of law because they do not create
new law; they merely interpret lawmaking that has already taken place.119
However, not all courts embrace this stark distinction between policy
statements and interpretive rules.120 Because interpretive rules and policy
statements are both exempt from notice-and-comment procedures, courts
are often “concerned only with distinguishing legislative rules from
nonlegislative rules (that is, interpretive rules and policy statements).”121
The D.C. Circuit has held that “[n]ot much turns on the distinction
between policy statements and interpretative rules. The more important
question is whether the disputed statement is merely informative or
interpretative, or whether it is [legislative] and thus establishes a binding
legal norm that is subject to judicial review.”122
112. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Veneman, 469 F.3d 826, 839 (9th Cir. 2006), opinion vacated on
reh’g en banc, 490 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2007).
113. See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text (providing examples of courts applying the
impact on agencies test to policy statements).
114. See Veneman, 469 F.3d at 840.
115. See id.
116. See id.; McKee, supra note 44, at 396–97. But see Lindsay, supra note 36, at 2468 (“Because
interpretative rules cannot ‘command anyone to do anything or to refrain from doing anything,’ they
do not create ‘adverse effects of a strictly legal kind,’ and therefore ‘typically cannot result in
justiciable disputes.’” (quoting Am. Tort Reform Ass’n v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 738
F.3d 387, 393, 396 (D.C. Cir. 2013))).
117. Veneman, 469 F.3d at 840.
118. Id.
119. Syncor Int’l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 94 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“An interpretative rule, on the
other hand, typically reflects an agency’s construction of a statute that has been entrusted to the agency
to administer. The legal norm is one that Congress has devised; the agency does not purport to modify
that norm, in other words, to engage in lawmaking.”).
120. McKee, supra note 44, at 389.
121. Id.
122. Am. Tort Reform Ass’n v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 738 F.3d 387, 393 (D.C.
Cir. 2013) (quoting EDWARDS, ELLIOT, & LEVY, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW 162 (2d ed.
2013)). But see Syncor Int’l Corp., 127 F.3d at 93–94 (“Further confusing the matter is the tendency
of courts and litigants to lump interpretative rules and policy statements together in contrast to
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Regardless of this theoretical dispute and the deceptively simple
definitions of policy statements and interpretive rules, courts have
struggled for decades to clarify the line between binding and non-binding
agency action. 123 This distinction matters for litigants, like Garcia,
wishing to challenge the procedural sufficiency of guidance documents
that may substantially impact them.

II.

FINALITY AS A BAR TO JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
AGENCY ACTION

Litigants challenging a policy statement or interpretive rule face
another hurdle: the APA only permits review of “final agency action.”124
Although agency action is presumptively reviewable,125 litigants
challenging agency action must overcome a daunting number of obstacles
before entering the courthouse. In addition to standing and ripeness under
Article III,126 a challenge to agency action must meet threshold
requirements such as remedy exhaustion,127 issue exhaustion,128
preclusion,129 and finality.130 Litigants must thus demonstrate that the rule
is “final” or risk avoiding judicial review altogether.131
A.

The APA’s Requirement of Finality

Finality is a congressional mandate, which means that Congress has
placed the requirement on courts through the statutes that govern
agencies.132 When an agency’s statute does not independently provide for
substantive rules, a tendency to which we have ourselves succumbed on occasion.”).
123. E.g., Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see supra section II.B.
124. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012).
125. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 494 (9th Cir. 2018)
(“Thus, as a general matter, the Supreme Court has consistently articulated ‘a “strong presumption”
favoring judicial review of administrative action.’” (quoting Mach Mining, LLC v. E.E.O.C., 575
U.S. 480, 486 (2015))); 5 U.S.C. § 702 (“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency
action . . . is entitled to judicial review.”).
126. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
127. 4 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 12:21 (3d ed. 2010).
128. Id.
129. See generally Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985); 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2012).
130. 5 U.S.C. § 704.
131. Id.
132. 2 KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 1567 (6th ed.
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judicial review, section 704 of the APA provides that “final agency action
for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court [is] subject to
judicial review.”133
In Norton v. South Utah Wilderness Alliance,134 the Supreme Court
emphasized the important role that finality and other APA bars to judicial
review serve in preventing judicial overreach:
The principal purpose of [the APA] limitation[s] is to protect
agencies from undue judicial interference with their lawful
discretion and to avoid judicial entanglement in abstract policy
disagreements which courts lack the expertise and information to
resolve . . . . The APA does not contemplate such pervasive
federal-court oversight.135
But finality arguably serves an “overlapping” function to other bars to
judicial review.136 Indeed, it can be difficult to distinguish among finality,
exhaustion, and ripeness,137 all of which control timing and serve the
purpose of preventing “premature judicial involvement in the
administrative decisionmaking process.”138 In one notable case,139 all
three judges on a D.C. Circuit panel agreed that a challenged agency
action was not reviewable, yet each rested their decision on a different

2019) (citing Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316 (1999)) (explaining
that Congress appears to have the power to determine whether an agency action is final); see also
Soundboard Ass’n v. FTC, 888 F.3d 1261, 1274 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“Unlike reviewability doctrines
developed by courts, final agency action is a statutory requirement set by Congress.”).
133. 5 U.S.C. § 704. The APA provides default standards for judicial review of agency action,
including finality. See McKee, supra note 44, at 389–90. In the past, courts sometimes applied a
legislative/non-legislative test to determine if action under direct review clauses provided in agency
statutes was a “regulation” or “final regulation.” See id. at 392. In Molycorp, Inc. v. EPA, 197 F.3d
543, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1999), the D.C. Circuit looked to whether the agency action had “binding effects”
to see if it was a “regulation” under the direct review statute at issue. Today, however, courts tend to
apply the same finality analysis for direct review statutes that they provide for APA finality. KOCH,
supra note 127, § 12:20; see also Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 478 (2001)
(holding that the term “final action” in the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2012), which
governs the EPA, is synonymous with “final agency action” in the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), 5 U.S.C. § 704).
134. 542 U.S. 55 (2004).
135. Id. at 55.
136. Manheim & Watts, supra note 52, at 1801; 2 HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 132, at 1453;
Ass’n of Flight Attendants-CWA v. Choa, 493 F.3d 155, 160 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“Exhaustion, ripeness,
and the requirement of final agency action are related and often overlapping doctrines.”).
137. 2 HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 132, at 1453.
138. Manheim & Watts, supra note 52, at 1801 (quoting RICHARD J. PIERCE, 2 ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE § 15.17, at 1105 (Aspen 4th ed. 2002)).
139. Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 814 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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timing doctrine.140 In an ironic turn, the D.C. Circuit recently stressed the
importance of distinguishing the three doctrines.141
If litigants cannot point to final agency action, the action is not
reviewable142 for substance,143 though it may be reviewed for procedural
sufficiency.144 Courts may still review the substance of non-final agency
action in one of two ways. First, once an enforcement proceeding or other
final agency action occurs, the substance of the non-final action becomes
reviewable.145 Second, under some courts’ interpretations, litigants may
waive the finality requirement by failing to raise it at the trial level.
In particular, the D.C. Circuit argued in Trudeau v. FTC146 that APA
finality can be waived because it is not a jurisdictional element.147
Resolving a jurisdictional element determines whether a court even has
the power to hear a case, meaning that the issue cannot be waived.148 In
Trudeau, the D.C. Circuit relied on Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,149 in which
the Supreme Court held that the Court will not interpret a threshold
determination as jurisdictional unless Congress “clearly states that a
threshold limitation on a statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional.”150
Because the APA does not clearly indicate that finality is jurisdictional,
the D.C. Circuit reasoned that the issue can be waived.151 Under this
140. 2 HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 132, at 1454.
141. Soundboard Ass’n v. FTC, 888 F.3d 1261, 1274 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“[W]hile courts often
mingle the three doctrines [of finality, ripeness, and exhaustion], they are analytically distinct.”).
142. McKee, supra note 44, at 397; see, e.g., Cal. Cmtys. Against Toxics v. EPA, 934 F.3d 627,
631 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“For the reasons explained herein, we hold that the Wehrum Memo is not final
agency action, and we dismiss the petitions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Act. We
express no opinion as to whether the Wehrum Memo is prudentially ripe, an interpretive rule or a
legislative rule, or on the merits of its interpretation.”).
143. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
144. See supra section I.B (describing procedural sufficiency tests for purported policy statements
and interpretive rules).
145. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (“[P]reliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or
ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency action.”); 5 U.S.C.
§ 551 (defining “agency action” as “the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction,
relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act”); Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d
1322, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (reviewing otherwise unreviewable presidential action once agency
action implementing it became final).
146. 456 F.3d 178 (2006).
147. Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 184 (2006). For a detailed overview of the reasoning
underlying this decision and its impact, see generally Sundeep Iyer, Jurisdictional Rules and Final
Agency Action, 125 YALE L.J. 785, 790 (2016).
148. Iyer, supra note 147, at 787.
149. 546 U.S. 500 (2006).
150. Id. at 515–16.
151. Trudeau, 456 F.3d at 184 n.7.
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interpretation, if the agency fails to dispute the finality of the challenged
action at the trial level, appellate courts will not be able to later revisit the
issue.152 As of 2014, several circuits that had originally applied finality as
a jurisdictional element—including, at least, the Second Circuit, the
Fourth Circuit, and the Federal Circuit—have found the D.C. Circuit’s
reasoning persuasive and subsequently questioned whether finality is
indeed jurisdictional.153
B.

The Supreme Court Defines Final Agency Action

In 1997, the Supreme Court synthesized its finality analysis into the
Bennett test: a two-part test that focused on legal consequences.154 In
several cases before Bennett v. Spear, 155 and in one subsequent 2016 case
Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co.,156 however, the Supreme Court
emphasized a “‘pragmatic’ approach” to finality, which looked to
practical effects as well.157 Notably, although Hawkes cited to Bennett as
the official rule for finality, the decision in Hawkes could extend Bennett’s
finality doctrine to consider not only legal consequences but also practical
consequences.
1.

The Bennett Test

In Bennett, the Supreme Court laid out the prevailing test to determine
whether agency action is indeed “final” under section 704.158 Under the
two-part test in Bennett, final agency action (1) “mark[s] the
‘consummation’ of the agency’s decisionmaking process” and (2) is
action by which “‘rights or obligations have been determined,’ or from
which ‘legal consequences will flow.’”159
In Bennett, litigants challenged an opinion letter issued by the Fish &
Wildlife Service under the Endangered Species Act (ESA).160 The ESA
requires the Secretary to identify “threatened” and “endangered” species
and their designated habitat, at which point other agencies must determine

152. Iyer, supra note 147, at 787.
153. Id. at 790.
154. McKee, supra note 44, at 374.
155. 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
156. 578 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016).
157. Id. at 1815.
158. McKee, supra note 44, at 374.
159. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 177–78.
160. Id. at 179.
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whether proposed action may affect that species or its habitat.161 If an
agency determines that its proposed action may affect that species, the
agency must meet with the Fish and Wildlife Service, which will issue an
opinion letter.162 That Biological Opinion determines whether the action
might jeopardize the species and what, if any, alternative actions the
agency should take.163 Any such actions are put in an Incidental Take
Statement, which lays out the “terms and conditions . . . that must be
complied with by the Federal agency . . . .”164
Although the government argued that the Biological Opinion did not
constitute “final agency action” because it was merely advisory and
created no legal obligation,165 the Court unanimously held that the opinion
letter was final.166 The Court pointed specifically to the binding language
in the Incidental Take Statement determining that the action met the
second prong of the finality test.167 As the Court explained, the agency
was, “to put it mildly, keenly aware of the virtually determinative effect
of its biological opinions.”168 Indeed, the Biological Opinion “alter[ed]
the legal regime to which the action agency is subject . . . .”169 The
Biological Opinion may not have been binding itself, but it would
inevitably trigger an Incidental Take Statement, which contained binding
language on its face.
2.

The Supreme Court’s Pragmatic Approach in Abbott Laboratories
and Hawkes

For thirty years prior to Bennett, Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner170
served as the leading case on finality.171 As part of its analysis of ripeness,
the Court in Abbott Laboratories held that a drug labeling regulation was

161. Id. at 157–58. The opinion letter in Bennett does not qualify under the APA as either a
regulation, a policy statement, or an interpretive rule. Instead, it has its own procedural requirements
as outlined by statute. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (2012). Bennett thus does not directly address how the
Supreme Court would approach finality in the context of a policy statement.
162. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 157–58.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 158 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4)) (emphasis added).
165. Id. at 177 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012)).
166. Id. at 179.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 170.
169. Id. at 178.
170. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
171. 4 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 12:21 (3d ed. 2010).
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final, although the agency had not brought enforcement proceedings.172
The Court in Abbott Laboratories applied what would later be referred
to as Bennett’s first prong. The regulation at issue “mark[ed] the
‘consummation’ of the agency’s decisionmaking process.”173 As the Court
explained, “[t]here [was] no hint that this regulation [was] informal . . . or
only the ruling of a subordinate official, . . . or tentative.”174
However, rather than referencing “rights or obligations” or “legal
consequences,” as the Court later did in announcing the second prong in
Bennett, 175 the Court in Abbott Laboratories emphasized the “direct and
immediate” impact that the regulation would have on the plaintiffs.176 The
Court explained that the regulation “ha[d] a direct effect on the day-today business” of regulated parties and put them “in a dilemma.”177
Plaintiffs, the Court explained, must either “comply . . . and incur the
costs . . . or they must follow their present course and risk prosecution.”178
The Court in Abbott Laboratories relied on several previous cases to
emphasize the “pragmatic” and “flexible” approach that it had generally
taken to finality.179 For example, an agency’s mere statement of its
intentions may constitute final agency action when “expected conformity
to [the agency’s intentions] causes injury cognizable by a court of
equity . . . .”180 Furthermore, agency action may be final even when the
action carries “no authority” except in giving notice of how to
interpret a statute.181
In 2016—nearly twenty years after the Supreme Court laid out
Bennett’s two-pronged test—U.S. Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes
Co.182 seemed to revive the pragmatic approach described in Abbott
Laboratories,183 significantly relaxing the standard for final agency
172. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 138.
173. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 177–78 (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333
U.S. 103, 113 (1948)).
174. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 151.
175. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178 (quoting Port of Bos. Marine Terminal Ass’n v. Rederiaktiebolaget
Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970)).
176. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 152.
177. Id. (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Celebrezze, 228 F. Supp. 855, 861 (D. Del.1964)).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 149–50 (citing Columbia Broad. Sys. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942); Frozen
Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40 (1956)).
180. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 150.
181. Id. (citing Frozen Food Express, 351 U.S. at 45).
182. __U.S.__, 136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016).
183. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., 578 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1807, 1815 (2016)
(explaining that the Court’s decision tracks the pragmatic approach applied in cases such as
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action.184 In Hawkes, the Court held that a jurisdictional determination that
an area contained “waters of the United States” by the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers was final agency action because it resulted in “direct and
appreciable legal consequences.”185 A “negative” jurisdictional
determination that the area did not contain “waters of the United States”
would have given the party “a five-year safe harbor from [government]
civil enforcement proceedings.”186 Therefore, a “positive” determination
that the area did contain “waters of the United States” also brought legal
consequences: the missed opportunity of a five-year safe harbor.187
Plaintiffs could simply have acted in contravention of the determination188
and faced an enforcement proceeding,189 which would have
incontrovertibly constituted final agency action.190 But, as the Court
explained, it would unfairly put the plaintiffs at risk for a large penalty if
a court ultimately sided with the agency.191 This final consideration
echoed the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Abbott Laboratories, where the
Court described the “dilemma” of plaintiffs who must either
“comply . . . and incur the costs . . . or . . . follow their present course and
risk prosecution.”192
As part of its analysis, the majority pointed out that its conclusion
“tracks the ‘pragmatic’ approach we have long taken to finality.”193 The
Court cited Abbott Laboratories and another case, Frozen Food Express
v. United States,194 in support of their longstanding pragmatic approach.195
The Hawkes Court emphasized a particular similarity between Frozen
Food and Hawkes: the threat of criminal penalties.196 In both cases, the
Court explained, “no administrative or criminal proceeding c[ould] be

Abbott Laboratories).
184. 2 HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 132, at 1454.
185. Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1810 (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (2016)).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1812.
188. Id. at 1814.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1815.
191. Id.
192. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152 (1967).
193. Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1815 (quoting Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149).
194. 351 U.S. 40 (1956).
195. Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1815 (citing Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40,
76 (1956)).
196. Id.
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brought for failure to conform to the [challenged agency action] itself.”197
However, the challenged agency action “warn[ed]” of “the risk of
significant criminal and civil penalties.”198 The decision in Hawkes
functionally revived the Abbott Laboratories pragmatic approach,
possibly extending the finality doctrine into practical consequences rather
than merely legal consequences,199 as had been laid out in Bennett.200
III. REVIEWING POLICY STATEMENTS AND INTERPRETIVE
RULES IN LIGHT OF FINALITY
The Supreme Court has not yet unambiguously held that an interpretive
rule or policy statement was final. The Court came close to speaking
directly on the issue in National Park Hospitality Association v. DOI.201
That case involved a regulation that had undergone notice-and-comment
rulemaking.202 Because the agency sought to interpret a statute that it did
not administer and had no power to enforce, the Court held that it was a
general statement of policy—rather than a regulation—under section 553
of the APA.203 In half a sentence devoid of any analysis, the Court
indicated that the regulation was final agency action, but then proceeded
to hold that the regulation was not ripe for review.204
In the absence of robust analysis from the Supreme Court, lower courts
have been divided on the meaning of Bennett’s second prong. The D.C.
Circuit generally applies a categorical approach to finality.205 That
approach virtually always holds that both interpretive rules and policy
statements are not final. The Ninth Circuit embraces a flexible approach—
drawing from cases like Abbott Laboratories and Hawkes.206 Courts in the
Ninth Circuit are more likely to hold that an interpretive rule is final
agency action under the Bennett test,207 but the finality of policy
statements was less clear until recently. Two cases decided in 2019

197. Id.
198. Id.
199. 4 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 12:21 (3d ed. 2010).
200. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997).
201. 538 U.S. 803 (2003).
202. Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. DOI, 538 U.S. 803, 806 (2003).
203. Id. at 809.
204. Id. at 812. The dissent agreed that the agency action was final, explaining that it was “not
tentative or likely to change.” Id. at 820 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
205. See infra section III.A.
206. Lindsay, supra note 36, at 2466–67.
207. See infra section III.B.
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indicate that both circuits may be shifting toward a more flexible approach
to Bennett’s second prong.208
A.

The D.C. Circuit’s Categorical Approach

The D.C. Circuit’s categorical approach appears to “categorically
preclude from pre-enforcement review all interpretative rules and policy
statements.”209 In other words, under the categorical approach, if the
guidance document at issue is a guidance document, it is not final. In
effect, the categorical approach has repurposed the procedural sufficiency
tests introduced in Part I, section B of this Comment.
When reviewing a policy statement, the D.C. Circuit appears to apply
the impact on agencies test—the test used for the procedural sufficiency
of policy statements210—in place of Bennett’s second prong.211 In
National Association of Home Builders v. Norton,212 the D.C. Circuit held
that a policy statement was not final because “there is insufficient
evidence in the record to conclude that either of the Protocols binds the
agency sufficiently to make it a substantive rule under the reasoning of [a
D.C. Circuit case applying the impact on agencies test].”213
Norton emphasized the binding effect of the challenged rule on the
agency’s discretion, which is also a key factor in the impact on agencies
test described in section II.B.3.214 When applying the impact on agencies
test, courts typically look at enforcement actions to see if they conform to
a purported policy statement.215 The Norton Court explained that “there
ha[d] been no enforcement actions that indicate[d] whether the FWS
208. See generally Cal. Cmtys. Against Toxics v. EPA, 934 F.3d 627 (D.C. Cir. 2019); Gill v. U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, 913 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2019).
209. Lindsay, supra note 36, at 2466.
210. See supra section I.B.
211. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Norton, 415 F.3d 8, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (emphasis added).
212. 415 F.3d 8 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
213. Id. at 17 (emphasis added). In place of the impact on agencies test, the Norton court referenced
Community Nutrition, a case that applied the impact on agencies test. See Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v.
Young, 818 F.2d 943, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“We conclude that in the circumstances of this case,
FDA by virtue of its own course of conduct has chosen to limit its discretion and promulgated action
levels which it gives a present, binding effect.”).
214. See, e.g., U.S. Telephone Ass’n v. FCC, 28 F.3d 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that a federal
agency may not issue a policy that binds agency officials’ discretion without first following the notice
and comment procedures outlined in the Administrative Procedure Act); Professionals and Patients
for Customized Care v. Shalala, 56 F.3d 592, 595 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[W]e follow the D.C. Circuit’s
analysis in determining whether [the rule] is a substantive rule under the APA, focusing primarily on
whether the rule has binding effect on agency discretion or severely restricts it.”).
215. See, e.g., U.S. Telephone Ass’n, 28 F.3d 1232; Shalala, 56 F.3d 592.
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consider[ed] itself bound by survey results.”216 Similarly, in a more recent
case, Sierra Club v. EPA,217 the D.C. Circuit applied the equivalent of the
impact on agencies test to hold that a policy statement was “not binding
on the agency or affected parties and therefore d[id] not constitute ‘final
action.’218 The arguments of both courts boiled down to this: the policy
statement was a policy statement, so it was not final.
Under the categorical approach, interpretive rules receive similar
treatment. In American Tort Reform Ass’n v. Occupational Safety &
Health Administration,219 the D.C. Circuit held that a labeling requirement
was not final precisely because it was an interpretive rule.220 The court
reasoned that “[b]ecause Paragraph (a)(2) is merely interpretative, it is
not subject to notice and comment rulemaking under the APA, and it is
not subject to judicial review . . . .”221 Applying the procedural sufficiency
test thus served a dual function: determining simultaneously that the
labeling requirement was an interpretive rule and that it was non-final.222
In Association of Flight Attendants v. Huerta,223 the D.C. Circuit
further entrenched the idea that a guidance document cannot be final.224
The court held that a guidance document was non-final without even
determining whether it was a policy statement or an interpretive rule.225
As the court explained, “[i]t really does not matter whether [the guidance
document] is viewed as a policy statement.”226 What mattered, was that
the guidance document was “not a legislative rule carrying the ‘force and
effect of law.’”227 Because it was a guidance document, it was not final.228
In a 2019 case, California Communities Against Toxics v. EPA, 229 the
D.C. Circuit took a sharp turn in the opposite direction.230 The D.C.

216. Norton, 415 F.3d at 17.
217. 873 F.3d 946 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
218. Id. at 948.
219. 738 F.3d 387 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
220. Id. at 390.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Ass’n of Flight Attendants-CWA, AFL-CIO v. Huerta, 785 F.3d 710, 713 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
224. Id. at 716.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. (quoting Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1204 (2015)).
228. Id. at 713 (“The Notice is nothing more than an internal guidance document . . . . Therefore,
the Notice does not reflect final agency action.”).
229. 934 F.3d 627 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
230. Id. at 627, 631.
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Circuit reviewed a memo issued by an administrator within the EPA
interpreting a section of the Clean Air Act.231 The court cautioned against
the reasoning in a line of cases that improperly combined “the related but
separate analysis of whether an agency action is a legislative rule.”232
According to the court, these cases, including Huerta, failed to recognize
recent Supreme Court precedent indicating that “the finality analysis is
distinct from the test for whether an agency action is a legislative rule.”233
In other words, the approach to finality should not be quite so categorical.
B.

The Ninth Circuit’s Flexible Approach

In contrast to the D.C. Circuit’s precedent, the Ninth Circuit recognizes
a stark difference between interpretive rules and policy statements.
Although interpretive rules do not carry the force and effect of law, they
may, in some cases, bind the agency’s discretion.234 Such interpretive
rules have legal consequences under the Bennett test and are considered
final.235 Policy statements, under the impact on agencies test, cannot bind
the agency’s discretion and thus cannot be final. Effectively, the Ninth
Circuit’s flexible approach applies the impact on agency test in place of
Bennett’s second prong. Thus, the Ninth Circuit differs from the D.C.
Circuit by allowing review of interpretive rules. However, this approach
appeared to preclude all policy statements from judicial review until a
2019 case, Gill v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,236 in which the Ninth Circuit held
that a policy statement was final.237
Under the flexible approach, some interpretive rules can be final
agency action. Although interpretive rules do not independently carry “the
force of law[,]” they may have legal consequences on the agency.238 For
example, in Oregon v. Ashcroft,239 the Attorney General had issued an
interpretive rule that declared that physician assisted suicide violated the

231. Id.
232. Id. at 634.
233. Id.
234. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Veneman, 469 F.3d 826, 839 (9th Cir. 2006), opinion vacated on
reh’g en banc, 490 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2007).
235. Id.
236. 913 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2019).
237. Id. at 1184–85 (citing Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 465 F.3d 977, 982 (9th
Cir. 2006)).
238. Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1148 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’d sub nom. Gonzales v. Oregon,
546 U.S. 243 (2006).
239.Id.

19 Parsons.docx (Do Not Delete)

520

4/28/20 7:23 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:495

Controlled Substances Act.240 The rule constituted final agency action
because the “instruction created direct and immediate consequences for
physicians who wish to prescribe controlled substances for assisted
suicide.”241 The directive “significantly and immediately alter[ed] the
legal landscape for Oregon physicians.”242 The dissenting opinion agreed
that that the rule was final “even though it [wa]s a nonbinding, preenforcement, interpretive rule.”243
The Ninth Circuit’s willingness to hold policy statements as final,
however, remained unclear for some time. Two opinions announced in
2006—Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Veneman,244 and Oregon Natural
Desert Association v. U.S. Forest Service245—indicated conflicting views
on whether a true policy statement could ever be final agency action
under Bennett.
In Veneman, the Ninth Circuit explicitly held that a true policy
statement could not constitute final agency action. In that case, the court
reviewed a disputed “Draft Policy” that was not yet issued.246 The issue
of finality hinged on whether the draft policy was an interpretive rule or a
policy statement.247 The court was careful to characterize the “Draft
Policy” as an interpretive rule rather than a policy statement.248 As an
interpretive rule, the “Draft Policy” would have been final because the
agency “would have bound itself to a particular interpretation of [the
statute] for enforcement purposes had it adopted the Draft Policy.”249
The court’s reasoning suggested that, like the D.C. Circuit, the
Veneman court had effectively supplanted Bennett’s second prong with
the impact on agency test. The court explained that a “‘typical policy
statement’ is ‘not reviewable at all.’”250 Unlike policy statements, which
by definition do not bind the agency’s discretion,251 interpretive rules, may

240. Id. at 1120.
241. Id. at 1147–48.
242. Id. at 1147. The Supreme Court later affirmed the Ninth Circuit but did not speak to finality
in its opinion. Gonzales, 546 U.S. 243.
243. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d at 1147.
244. 469 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 2006), opinion vacated on reh’g en banc, 490 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2007).
245. 465 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2006).
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 839.
249. Id. at 840 (emphasis added).
250. Id. at 839 (quoting Tozzi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 271 F.3d 301, 309 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (Silberman, J., concurring)).
251. Syncor Int’l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 93–94 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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bind the agency, triggering legal consequences.252 This repurposing of the
impact on agencies test appeared to categorically preclude judicial review
of a true policy statement.253 Indeed, a district court in the Ninth Circuit
recently followed suit, holding that a purported policy statement was final
agency action precisely because it was not a true policy statement.254
In Oregon Natural Desert,255 decided a few months after Veneman, the
Ninth Circuit suggested a more flexible approach, one that might allow
review of a policy statement. The court held as final agency action the
United States Forest Service’s issuance of annual operating instructions
“to permittees who graze livestock on national forest land.” 256 The court
did not classify the agency action as either an interpretive rule or a policy
statement.257 Significantly, the court did not ask whether the permit
instructions had a binding effect on the agency itself when articulating its
test for finality.258 Instead, the court highlighted the flexible use of the
word “or” in the second prong of the Bennett test.259 The court surmised
that this disjunctive test allowed review of agency actions that “impose an
obligation, deny a right, or fix some legal relationship as a consummation
of the administrative process.”260 This approach allows review of agency
action that “has a ‘direct and immediate . . . effect on the day-to-day
business’” of affected parties.261 In other words, a guidance document’s
“practical effects and substantial impact on regulated parties can be
enough to meet Bennett’s second prong.”262 This recharacterization of the
test arguably opened the door for judicial review of some
policy statements.
In the 2019 case Gill v. United States Department of Justice,263 the
Ninth Circuit firmly resolved the tension between Veneman and Oregon
Natural Desert. Drawing on the holding in Oregon Natural Desert, the
252. Veneman, 469 F.3d at 840.
253. Id.
254. See W. Watersheds Project v. Zinke, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1204, 1227, 1232 (D. Idaho 2018)
(holding that a policy statement was not a legislative rule “for reasons already articulated” in the
section explaining why it was not final).
255. 465 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2006).
256. Id. at 979.
257. Id.
258. See generally id.
259. See generally id.
260. Id. at 987 (emphasis in original) (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S.
Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948).
261. Id. at 987 (quoting FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 239 (1980)).
262. Lindsay, supra note 36, at 2466.
263. 913 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2019).
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Ninth Circuit explicitly held that a policy statement constituted final
agency action.264 The court determined that the Functional Standard, a
standardized system of information sharing among agencies regarding
terrorism activities,265 was a policy statement.266 The court nevertheless
held that it was final because it triggered “legal and practical effects.”267
The court analyzed the legal and practical effects of the Functional
Standard. First, the court determined that the Functional Standard had
legal consequences under Oregon Natural Desert, although participation
in the national information sharing program was within the agencies’
discretion.268 The court explained that once an agency decided to
participate in the program, the administering agency could revoke its
membership—and consequently remove the agency’s access to shared
information—for failure to comply with the Functional Standard.269
Second, the court determined that the Functional Standard had practical
consequences.270 The court explained that when an agency joined the
program, “there was the immediate understanding that its analysts would
conform to the Functional Standard.”271 The case itself did not indicate
whether practical effects alone could render an agency action final.272
Significantly, however, it demonstrated that a non-binding policy
statement could trigger “legal consequences” as required under the
Bennett test and that practical effects played a role in the analysis
as well.273
IV. THE SUBSTANTIAL IMPACT APPROACH TO FINALITY
The Supreme Court should adopt the substantial impact test in place of
264. Id. at 1185.
265. President George W. Bush, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies,
(Dec. 16, 2005), https://fas.org/sgp/news/2005/12/wh121605-memo.html [https://perma.cc/J5P2-B8SK].
266. Gill, 913 F.3d at 1186–87.
267. Id. at 1184–85 (citing Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 465 F.3d 977, 982 (9th
Cir. 2006)) (emphasis added).
268. Id. at 1185.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. See SurvJustice Inc. v. DeVos, No. 18-CV-00535-JSC, 2019 BL 112847, at *5 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 29, 2019) (“The Court is not convinced that the Gill court’s holding regarding finality based on
the practical effects of the Functional Standard can carry that weight. The holding instead appears
intertwined with the court’s holding regarding the legal consequences because both rely on the
eGuardian User Agreement.”).
273. Id. at *3 (“[T]he Gill court determined that the Functional Standard produced legal
consequences despite its nonbinding nature.”) (citing Gill, 913 F.3d at 1184-85).
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Bennett’s second prong. First, judicial review allows courts to perform an
essential check on agency action. Second, Supreme Court precedent
supports a substantial impact approach to finality. Rather than focus
merely on a rule’s effect on the agency itself—as many lower court
decisions have done—the Supreme Court’s pragmatic approach seems to
emphasize the effect that agency action has on parties outside of the
agency. Third, the substantial impact test provides a model for reviewing
a small subset of policy statements, like the DACA rescission, that have a
substantial impact on private individuals but do not bind the discretion of
agency officials.
A.

The Importance of Judicial Review for Policy Statements

When enacting the APA, Congress warned “that the practice of creating
administrative agencies . . . threatens to develop a ‘fourth branch’ of the
Government for which there is no sanction in the Constitution.”274
Congress likely had this concern in mind when it drafted section 553 of
the APA, providing for notice-and-comment procedures.275 These
procedures were intended to make agencies more accountable to the
public.276 However, when agencies issue policy statements, they
necessarily bypass these procedures277 and the accountability that stems
from them. Generally, the more extensive procedures an agency employs
the more judicial deference its conclusions receive.278 Denying judicial
review of policy statements has the inverse result: agency action requiring
virtually no procedures results in no judicial review at all and allows
agencies complete deference.279 By issuing policy statements, agencies
can dodge both notice-and-comment procedures and judicial review,
possibly avoiding accountability altogether.280
With increased presidential control over agencies,281 opponents may

274. H.R. REP. NO. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 at 242 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 1195, 1195.
275. Tracy C. Hauser, The Administrative Procedure Act, Procedural Rule Exception to the Notice
and Comment Requirement - A Survey of Cases, 5 ADMIN. L.J. 519, 521 (1991).
276. Id.
277. See Hylas, supra note 24, at 1648–49.
278. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230–31 (2001) (recognizing that
extensive procedures warrant deference and denying Chevron deference because agency’s procedures
were “far removed . . . from [the] notice-and-comment process”).
279. McKee, supra note 44, at 401.
280. Cal. Cmtys. Against Toxics v. EPA, 934 F.3d 627, 635–36 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (citing William
Funk, Final Agency Action After Hawkes, 11 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 285, 304 (2017)).
281. See Hylas, supra note 24, at 1651; see generally Kathryn A. Watts, Controlling Presidential
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argue that the public holds agencies accountable through the political
process.282 However, this explanation is unsatisfactory for two reasons.
First, the mere availability of judicial review lends legitimacy to federal
agencies.283 Judicial review “suggests that the will of the majority is
always subject to the limitations of the Constitution and that government
therefore operates by consent inasmuch as all citizens have agreed to
government action in accordance with the Constitution.”284 Second,
providing judicial review of an agency’s reasoning forces the agency to
make reasoned decisions and, importantly, to own up to its decisions, two
actions which are necessary for an informed public to hold agencies
accountable.285 This sentiment is particularly salient when the agency is
implying that its administering statute prevents it from acting, thereby
pushing the burden onto Congress.286
It is true that not all parties affected by non-final agency action are
barred from the courthouse. After all, litigants may wait for the agency to
rely on the policy statement in an enforcement proceeding,287 or they may
bring constitutional claims.288 But “regulatory beneficiaries . . . are
generally not parties to enforcement actions, and, therefore, may only be
able to challenge nonlegislative rules via judicial review.”289 The threat of
Control, 114 MICH. L. REV. 683 (2016) (detailing the evolution of presidential control over agencies
from the Reagan Administration to the Obama Administration); id. at 685 (“This Article picks up
where Kagan left off nearly fifteen years ago, demonstrating that presidential control has deepened
during the [Bush and Obama] presidencies.”).
282. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 59 (1983) (“A change in administration brought about by the people casting their votes is a
perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency’s reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its
programs and regulations.”). The view that agencies will be responsive to the will of the public also
contradicts the view that agencies should “apply their expertise dispassionately,” another argument
for limited review of agency action. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth
Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987
DUKE L.J. 387, 434 n.233 (1987).
283. Shapiro, supra note 282, at 394–95.
284. Id. at 395.
285. See Regents, 908 F.3d 476, 498 (explaining that when an agency attempts to hide beneath its
discretion while really making a legal argument, it is the job of the courts to determine if the legal
argument is sound).
286. See id.
287. Am. Tort Reform Ass’n v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin. 738 F.3d 387, 390 (D.C.
Cir. 2013) (Non-final agency action “is not subject to judicial review unless it is relied upon or applied
to support an agency action in a particular case”).
288. Navajo Nation v. Dep’t of the Interior, 876 F.3d 1144, 1170 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting 5 U.S.C.
§ 702 (2012)) (“Claims not grounded in the APA, like the constitutional claims in Presbyterian
Church and VCS I, ‘do[ ] not depend on the cause of action found in the first sentence of § 702’ and
thus § 704’s limitation does not apply to them.”).
289. Cal. Cmtys. Against Toxics v. EPA, 934 F.3d 627, 636 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (citing Nina A.
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an enforcement proceeding may be enough to coerce some parties into
obeying, particularly where an enforcement proceeding would be
especially costly.290 Additionally, not all those harmed by a policy
statement can point to a viable constitutional claim.
“At bottom, finality is about agency accountability for the decisions it
makes and the consequences it unleashes.”291 The decision to grant or
deny review under finality determines for example “whether those who
are told to close up shop and discharge their employees are entitled first
to a day in court.”292 If courts continue to interpret policy statements as
non-final, they may preclude themselves from carrying out this essential
function on an entire category of influential agency action.
B.

Supreme Court Precedent Supports a Substantial Impact Approach
to Finality

Supreme Court precedent supports shifting away from the more
categorical approach and instead adopting a substantial impact approach
toward finality. First, the lower courts’ approach of supplanting Bennett’s
second prong with the impact on agencies test defies binding Supreme Court
precedent. Second, cases employing the Supreme Court’s pragmatic
approach, as recently emphasized in Hawkes, suggest that the Court also
considers a rule’s impact outside of the agency in its finality analysis. A
substantial impact approach, which considers the action’s practical impact
outside of the agency, would thus be consistent with this precedent.
First, with the exception of the Gill Court, it appears that the lower courts
are categorically classifying policy statements as non-final.293 However, this
categorical approach contradicts the Supreme Court’s precedent. The
decision in Park Hospitality Association v. DOI294—holding that what it
deemed to be a “general statement of policy” was final—suggests that policy
statements are at least not categorically non-final.295 Indeed, no trace of the
categorical approach appears in either Bennett or Hawkes: neither court

Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397,
420–24 (2007)).
290. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152 (1967).
291. Soundboard Ass’n v. FTC, 888 F.3d 1261, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (Millett, J., dissenting),
petition for cert. filed.
292. Id. at 1285.
293. See supra Part III.
294. 538 U.S. 803 (2003).
295. Id. at 809 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2012) (quotations omitted)).
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“asked whether the action at issue had the force and effect of law”296; nor did
they ask whether the agency action was binding on the agency itself.297
Supplanting Bennett’s second prong with the impact on agencies test may
have the reverse effect intended by the Supreme Court’s pragmatic approach.
In Abbott Laboratories, the Court explained that the challenged regulation
put private parties “in a dilemma” because they had to comply or risk an
enforcement proceeding.298 The Norton Court in the D.C. Circuit applied the
equivalent of the impact on agencies test to determine that agency action was
not final.299 The court explained that “there ha[d] been no enforcement
actions that indicate[d] whether the FWS consider[ed] itself bound by survey
results.”300 The holding effectively requires courts to wait for the agency to
bring enforcement proceedings to determine if the policy statement is actually
binding and therefore final.301 Requiring that a purported policy statement
bind the agency before labeling it final seems to undermine the holding in
Abbott Laboratories and other Supreme Court cases that take a pragmatic
approach to finality. After all, these cases emphasized the fact that agency
action may be final before enforcement proceedings are brought.302
Second, precedent supports an approach that looks to the practical effect
of a rule outside of the agency. The Court in Frozen Food held as final an
order that “had no authority except to give notice of how the Commission
interpreted . . .” the law because of practical consequences on parties outside
of the agency.303 Because the order warned private parties that they risked
separate criminal penalties, it was final and immediately reviewable.304
Furthermore, in Abbott Laboratories, the Court emphasized the challenged
regulation’s “direct effect on the day-to-day business” of regulated parties.305
And in 2016, Hawkes reemphasized this pragmatic approach.306
Parties affected by policy statements may also face the dilemma
highlighted in Abbott Laboratories307 Individuals may reasonably fear an
296. Cal. Cmtys. Against Toxics v. EPA, 934 F.3d 627, 635 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
297. See generally Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997); U.S. Army Corps of Engineers v.
Hawkes Co., 578 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016).
298. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152 (1967).
299. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Norton, 415 F.3d 8, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
300. Id.
301. See id.
302. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 152.
303. Id. (citing Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40 (1956)).
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. See U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 578 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1807, 1815 (2016).
307. See Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 152.
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enforcement proceeding even if the agency has not officially bound itself
and committed to enforcing its policy statement. The DACA rescission
exemplifies this. Indeed, DHS may continue to grant deferred action on a
case-by-case basis and to classify DACA recipients as low priority for
deportation.308 However, the agency itself warned DACA recipients to “be
prepared to no longer remain here.”309
Opponents may argue that the substantial impact test has no place in
the jurisprudence because Vermont Yankee’s310 holding is widely viewed
as invalidating the substantial impact test as applied to procedural
sufficiency. However, Vermont Yankee’s holding cannot fairly be read to
bar the use of the substantial impact test in all areas. Courts have generally
assumed that the holding of Vermont Yankee invalidated the substantial
impact test as it was applied to notice-and-comment procedures only.311
Vermont Yankee emphasized the importance of giving discretion to
agencies “in determining when extra procedural devices should be
employed.”312 It does not follow, then, that courts should give discretion
to agencies in determining whether their action should be reviewable.
Indeed, considering the importance of judicial review for agency
accountability, such a result would be absurd.
Furthermore, the substantial impact test combined with the first prong of
Bennett satisfies the purpose of finality as defined by the Supreme Court.
Finality seeks to control timing,313 yet Bennett’s first prong satisfies much of
the timing element.314 Courts must wait for action that “marks the
consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process” before they can
review it.315 Requiring the agency action to have a substantial impact on
parties outside the agency also serves “to protect agencies from undue judicial
interference with their lawful discretion . . . .”316 If agency action marks the
308. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 513 (9th Cir.
2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 2779 1156 (June 28, 2019) (“[T]he rescission memorandum . . . leaves
in place the background principle that deferred action is available on a case-by-case basis.” (citing
Duke Memo, supra note 18)).
309. Rebecca Shabad, How the Decision to End DACA Affects “Dreamers”, CBS NEWS (Sept. 5,
2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-the-decision-to-end-daca-affects-dreamers/
[https://perma.cc/7LUU-K2YZ].
310. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
311. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 152.
312. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 546.
313. 2 HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 136, at 1453.
314. See also McKee, supra note 44, at 406–07 (arguing that Bennett’s first prong alone would
satisfy Congress’s purpose behind the finality requirement).
315. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997).
316. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 56 (2004).
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consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process, that party has
necessarily exhausted its administrative remedies. If at that point, the action
has a substantial impact on a private party who has no other remedies
available, judicial interference cannot fairly be said to be “undue.”
C.

The DACA Rescission Would Have a Substantial Impact

The DACA rescission typifies a policy statement that does not bind the
agency yet still has a substantial impact outside of the agency. According
to the Ninth Circuit, the DACA rescission survives the impact on agencies
test and is a policy statement under the modern application of the law; 317
however, the Ninth Circuit never addressed finality, likely because the
government never raised the issue.318 After DACA’s rescission, litigants
filed suit in various jurisdictions across the country.319 In response to each
of these lawsuits, the DHS failed to directly dispute that the policy
rescinding DACA was final agency action under APA section 704.320
317. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 486 (9th Cir. 2018).
318. See infra notes 320–322.
319. Regents, 908 F.3d at 514; Batalla Vidal v. Duke (No. 17-cv-5228-NGG-JO) (E.D.N.Y. Oct.
27, 2017); NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209, 237 (D.D.C. 2018), adhered to on denial of
reconsideration, 315 F. Supp. 3d 457 (D.D.C. 2018).
320. Defendants’ Notice of Motion And Motion to Dismiss All N.D. Cal. DACA Cases;
Memorandum In Support, Regents, 908 F.3d 476 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 3:17-cv-05211-WHA) (No.
3:17-cv-05235-WHA) (No. 3:17-cv-05329-WHA) (No. 3:17-cv-05380-WHA) (No. 3:17-cv-05813WHA) (N.D. CA 2017); Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209
(D.D.C. 2018) (No. 17-1907); Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss Or, In The Alternative, For Summary
Judgment, Trustees of Princeton v. U.S., 298 F. Supp. 3d 209 (D.D.C. 2017) (No. 17-cv-2325);
Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss Or, In The Alternative, For Summary Judgment, Casa De Md. v.
U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec., 284 F. Supp. 3d 758 (D. Md. 2017) (No. 17-cv-2942); Defendants’
Motion To Dismiss, Batalla Vidal v. Duke, 295 F. Supp. 3d 127 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (No. 16-cv-41196)
(No. 16-cv-4756) (No. 17-cv-5228); Plaintiffs’ Motion for Provisional Relief at 16, n.7, Nos. 17-CV05211-WHA, 17-CV-05235-WHA, 17-CV-05329-WHA, 17-CV-05380-WHA, 17-CV-05813-WHA
(Nov. 2017) (“In the motion to dismiss filed in Batalla Vidal v. Duke, No. 16-cv-41196 (E.D.N.Y.
Oct. 27, 2017), ECF No. 95-1, defendants did not challenge finality or ripeness. If defendants take a
contrary position in this case, plaintiffs will respond either in their opposition to defendants’ motion
to dismiss or in their reply supporting the instant motion.”). The government’s motions did raise
several issues that were peripheral to finality. The government argued that the Plaintiffs’ claim that
DHS violated 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) failed because its requirement to publish impact on small
businesses only applies to rules that have gone through notice-and-comment rulemaking. See Motion
to Dismiss at 39, Batalla Vidal v. Duke, 295 F. Supp. 3d 127 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (No. 16-cv-4756-NGGJo) (No. 17-cv-5228-NGG-JO) (quoting U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 400 F.3d 29, 42 (D.C. Cir.
2005)), (“The RFA’s requirement that an agency publish analyses of a rule’s impact on small
businesses applies only ‘when an agency promulgates a final rule under section 553 of . . . title [5],
after being required by that section or any other law to publish a general notice of proposed
rulemaking.’”). The government also argued that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (2012) only allows review of
final removal decisions and that this was not a final removal decision. See Motion to Dismiss at 22,
Casa De Md., 284 F. Supp. 3d 758 (“[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by
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Under the D.C. Circuit’s view in Trudeau, discussed above,321 the issue may
have been waived. Although the Supreme Court may never rule on finality
here, this case presents an example of a policy statement that would be final
under the proposed substantial impact approach.
Under the older substantial impact test, the rescission of DACA likely
would have been deemed a legislative rule, not a policy statement. Similarly,
under a substantial impact approach to finality, the DACA rescission would
be final agency action. Lewis-Mota322—discussed in Part I of this Comment
as an example of the substantial impact test—provides a useful model for
analyzing the substantial impact of the DACA rescission.
The DACA rescission mirrors the fact pattern in Lewis-Mota, a case that
applied the substantial impact test to hold that the Secretary of Labor’s
revocation of a policy was actually a legislative rule.323 In Lewis-Mota, the
Secretary rescinded a program that gave priority to applicants seeking
permanent residence who had specified occupations.324 Similarly, the case at
hand involves a rescission of DACA, a program that gave deferred action
priority to undocumented individuals meeting certain criteria.325
Although the agency in Lewis-Mota, like DHS,326 could still review the
applications of those individuals on a case-by-case basis, the court held that
both the original program and the rescission of that program would have a
substantial impact on both the undocumented individuals seeking permanent
residence and employers seeking to hire those individuals.327 Permanent
residents would face a more burdensome application process, and employers

or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the [Secretary of Homeland Security]
to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this
chapter.”) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)). The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument. See Regents, 908
F.3d at 503 (“The Supreme Court has explicitly held that this section ‘applies only to three discrete
actions
that
the
[Secretary]
may
take:
her
‘decision
or
action’
to
‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’” (quoting Reno v. Am.-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999)) (emphasis in original)). The government also
argued that there was no change to DHS’s privacy policy, so there was no APA finality and the claims
regarding the privacy policy were not final agency action. See Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 34,
Trustees of Princeton, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209 (No. 17-cv-2325); Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 37,
Casa De Md. 284 F. Supp. 3d 758, 38–39 (No. 17-cv-2942).
321. See supra citation to section II.A.
322. Lewis-Mota v. Sec’y of Labor, 469 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1972).
323. Id. at 482.
324. Id. at 480.
325. Napolitano Memo, supra note 7.
326. Duke Memo, supra note 18; Carrie Johnson, Trump Rescinds DACA, Calls on Congress to
Replace It, NPR (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/09/06/548819221/trump-administrationrescinds-daca-calls-on-congress-to-replace-it [https://perma.cc/9LHP-4866].
327. Lewis-Mota, 469 F.2d at 482.
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would struggle to fill job vacancies.328
Revoking DACA would have an even greater impact on both DACA
recipients and employers. DACA recipients would be subject to
deportation, lose their Employment Authorization Documents and other
government benefits, and be unable to reenter the United States if they had
not already obtained Advance Parole.329 Employers would not be able to
retain DACA recipients once their Employment Authorization Documents
expired and would be forced to replace them.330 Moreover, the effect on the
economy is estimated to be as much as $280 billion in lost growth331 and
700,000 lost jobs.332
Because DHS still retains its discretion to grant deferred action on a caseby-case basis, the rescission of DACA does not bind the agency and thus is
not a substantive rule. Under the modern impact on agency test, this means
that the rescission of DACA did not need to undergo notice-and-comment
procedures. If courts adopted a substantial impact approach to Bennett’s
second prong, the rescission of DACA would be final agency action and thus
reviewable whether or not the issue had been waived.
CONCLUSION
DHS’s rescission of DACA occupies a curious space in administrative
law. It has the potential to substantially impact hundreds of thousands of
undocumented individuals, yet in virtually all lower courts it is not reviewable
because it is a policy statement. Some courts applying a flexible approach are
willing to review interpretive rules, and recently, in Gill, the Ninth Circuit
was willing to review a policy statement. This Comment argues that some
policy statements, such as the rescission of DACA, should also be reviewable
in courts. By applying the substantial impact test as Bennett’s second prong,
courts could hold as final any agency action that (1) marks the end of the
agency’s decisionmaking process and (2) has a substantial impact outside of
the agency. Applying the substantial impact test adheres to the Supreme
Court’s more recent precedent in cases like Hawkes, which emphasize a
pragmatic approach. Moreover, it allows courts to hold agencies accountable
when their actions have a substantial impact on private individuals.

328. Id.
329. Rebecca Shabad, How the Decision to End DACA Affects “Dreamers”, CBS NEWS (Sept. 5, 2017),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-the-decision-to-end-daca-affects-dreamers [https://perma.cc/7LUU-K2YZ].
330. Id.
331. Alana Abramson, Here’s How Much Rescinding DACA Could Cost the U.S. Economy,
FORTUNE (Sept. 6, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/09/05/daca-donald-trump-economic-impact/
[https://perma.cc/934F-BESM].
332. Id.

